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Purpose: The main objective of this study is to measure 
the effect of managerial ability on financial reporting 
timeliness in Egypt.  
Methodology: We analyzed a sample of Egyptian firms 
listed on the EGX100 index, the final sample was 62 firms 
during the period 2014 - 2018, we measured managerial 
ability depending on data envelope analysis (DEA) 
presented by Demerjian et al. (2012). The data was 
analyzed through the OLS method.   
Findings: Under the resource-based theory, we expect 
that higher ability managers own the utmost human 
capital, they are more able to maintain good internal 
control systems and provide higher earnings quality. 
Consequently, we predict that higher ability managers 
provide financial statements in a timely manner. The 
results confirm a negative relationship between 
managerial ability and financial reporting lag.     
Originality/Value: Our results provide insights to 
researchers, investors, regulators, auditors, and other 
stakeholders in emerging economies to understand and 
perceive the implications of managerial ability on financial 
reporting timeliness.  
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Managerial ability is one of the most important variables that has been investigated 
extensively in recent years as a valuable resource that has a significant positive impact on 
earnings quality and firm value, although there is a theoretical assumption and empirical 
evidence consistent with this perspective (Coff, 1999; Holcomb et al. 2009; Demerjian et al. 
2013; Chen et al. 2015; Arora et al. 2017; García‐Meca and García‐Sánchez 2018; García‐
Sánchez and García‐Meca 2018). Nevertheless, there is a literature stream that supports the 
opportunism hypothesis for high-ability managers (Baik et al. 2012; Mishra, 2014; Andreou 
et al. 2016; Yung and Chen, 2017; Habib and Hasan, 2017). 
Under the resource-based theory, the managerial ability is a resource that enhances 
competitive advantages for the firms, high ability managers have better knowledge, 
experience (Coff, 1999; Holcomb et al. 2009), they are more able to achieve investment 
efficiency (García‐Sánchez and García‐Meca 2018), innovation success and higher growth 
rates (Holbrook et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2015). A stream of literature that has examined the 
impact of managerial ability on accounting and disclosure policies was consistent with 
resource-based theory, confirming a positive impact of managerial ability on both earnings 
quality (e.g; Demerjian et al. 2013; García-Meca and García-Sánchez 2018), and financial 
reporting timeliness (Abernathy et al. 2018).  
However, there is another stream of literature that is consistent with the opportunism 
hypothesis for managerial ability, Baik et al. (2012) and Hassanzadeh et al. (2013) confirm a 
negative relationship between earnings quality and managerial ability. Andreou et al. 
(2016); Yung and Chen, (2018) confirm that the higher ability managers are more risk-
taking, and more likely to overinvestment (Habib and Hasan, 2017).  
Consequently examining the impact of managerial ability on financial reporting timeliness 
contributes to addressing the research gap in the literature that investigates the accounting 
implications of managerial ability in general and in emerging markets in particular. The 
peculiarity of emerging markets due to their weakness of both investor protection and 
corporate governance systems may increase the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors for 
higher ability managers (Baik et al. 2012). Theoretical evidence considering managerial 
ability as one of the most important resources in the firm, however, the empirical results are 
not fully confirmed this perspective and it still needs to investigate the relationships in the 
emerging markets, that will be beneficial to auditors, boards, investors, and regulators 
(Demerjian et al. 2020). 
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We contribute to the literature that examines the accounting implications of managerial 
ability in emerging economies. Within our knowledge, it is the first study that examines the 
effect of managerial ability on financial reporting timeliness in Egypt, our results are based 
on a sample of non-financial firms from Egypt as one of the oldest and biggest emerging 
markets in the Middle East and Africa. We find robust evidence confirming a negative effect 
of managerial ability on financial reporting lag in Egypt. The results shed light on the value-
added of managerial ability in financial reporting timeliness context in the emerging 
markets.   
The remainder of this paper will organize as follows. Section 2; background and hypothesis 
development. Section 3; research design. Sections 4; empirical results.  Sections 5; discussion, 
conclusion, and future research. 
2- Background and Hypothesis Development:  
2.1 Managerial Ability:   
A stream of research was spawned under upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason's 
1984), providing consistent evidence that individual characteristics of the managers can 
affect firm decisions, such as investment and financial decisions, organizational practices, 
and firm's performance (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Bamber et al. (2010) confirm that 
manager's background and their experience affect significantly on voluntary disclosures 
policies in the firms. Ge et al. (2011); and DeJong and Ling (2013) confirming a significant 
effect of individual characteristics of managers on accounting and disclosure policies in the 
firms.  
Managerial ability is considered as one of the most important characteristics of managers 
that have been examined in recent accounting literature. It refers to the extent that managers 
can understand a firm's economic position, the industry's circumstances, and their ability to 
accurately assess both future opportunities and firm performance (Arora et al. 2017). High 
ability managers have experience and skills qualifying them to make good decisions that 
contribute to economic efficiency, the most important skills that lead to managerial ability 
are (Katz, 1974); [1] Human skills; it mean the quality possessed by a manager to work 
effectively with others and motivate individuals and groups; [2] Technical skills; it mean 
technical knowledge of the different jobs, negotiating ability, and handling with technology 
and discipline tools such as; accounting information systems in general and internal control 
systems in particular; [3] Conceptual skills; it mean the ability to see the firm as a single unit, 
and perceive the relationships between the various functions in the firm, in addition, the 
ability to understand concepts, develop ideas and achieve  strategies. Consequently, the 
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managerial ability is resultant of learning and accumulated experience, which helps 
managers to understand the economic position of the firm and industry's structure to which 
it belongs, this enables them to assess the available opportunities and the future 
performance of the firm accurately (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Holcomb et al. 2009; 
Demerjian et al. 2012; Wang, 2013). 
Resource-based theory confirms that managerial ability is a resource that adds value to the 
firms through efficient use of resources, enhancing firms' competitive advantages (Holcomb 
et al. 2009). Under the efficiency hypothesis, researchers argue that higher ability managers 
have better knowledge, experience, and performance than other managers (Coff, 1999; 
Holcomb et al. 2009). Many empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis. García‐
Sánchez and García‐Meca (2018) confirm a positive relationship between managerial ability 
and investment efficiency. Holbrook et al. (2000); Chen et al. (2015), confirm an increase in 
innovation success and growth rates in firms as managerial ability increase. Moreover, firms 
with higher ability managers provide higher earnings quality and are less likely to prone to 
financial restatements (Demerjian et al. 2013). These firms also adhere to timely disclosure 
and have less probability of financial reporting lag (Abernathy et al. 2018). Also, they issue 
more accurate earnings forecasts, and investors in financial markets are more responsive to 
these expectations, which in turn improve stock market returns (Hayes and Schaefer, 1999; 
Baik et al. 2011; Luo and Zhou, 2017), decrease the information risks contributing to lower 
cost of debt (De Franco et al. 2017). In addition, the literature confirms that higher ability 
managers are committing income smoothing practices in a path of utilitarianism devoid of 
opportunism which improves the earnings informativeness and stock prices 
informativeness (Baik et al. 2019; Demerjian et al. 2020).   
On the contrary, other literature supports the opportunistic hypothesis, it confirms lower 
earnings quality for higher ability managers (Francis et al. 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2009; 
Baik et al. 2012). They are more risk-taking (Andreou et al. 2016; Yung and Chen, 2018), 
committing inefficient investments as a result of overinvestment behaviors (Habib and 
Hasan, 2017). Accordingly, firms with higher ability managers are suffering from higher 
agency problems which ultimately increase both stock price crash risk and cost of capital 
(Mishra, 2014; Habib and Hasan 2017). 
2.2 Managerial Ability and financial reporting timeliness:   
The managerial ability has been examined dramatically in recent research in accounting and 
auditing, especially after developing an empirical measure for managerial ability by 
Demerjian et al. (2012). A stream of literature investigated the effect of managerial ability 
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on earnings quality based on the resource-based theory which assumes that managerial 
ability is the most important resource in the firm that enhances efficient use for the 
resources and achieves competitive advantages (Holcomb et al. 2009).  
Some literature is consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, confirming that higher ability 
managers are more likely to establish and maintain more effective internal control, which 
increases their ability to monitor financial reporting quality (Lee 2015). Consistent with this 
result, some literature finds a positive relation between managerial ability and earnings 
quality in the developed and emerging economies (e.g; Demerjian et al. 2013, Huang and Sun 
2017; Petkevich and Prevost 2018; Sales et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2017; SeTin and 
Murwaningsari 2018). However, other literature confirms a negative relation between 
managerial ability and earnings quality (Baik et al. 2012; Hassanzadeh et al. 2013), this 
negative relation is moderated by the strength of investor protection systems (Baik et al. 
2012).  
In conjunction with an emerging literature that examines the implications of managerial 
ability on disclosure and accounting policies under resource-based theory, it is expected that 
higher ability managers may provide financial statements in a timeliness manner. Financial 
reporting timeliness is one of the most important qualitative characteristics of financial 
statements. It happens when providing information in the time frame imposed by the 
regulatory bodies and which enables the user to make economic decisions (FASB 1980). 
Owusu-Ansah (2000) argues that timely disclosure is an important tool for limiting insider 
trading, reducing information asymmetry, and limiting opportunities to spread leaks and 
rumors about the firms and their financial performance in emerging markets. Financial 
reporting timeliness is of interest to managers, researchers, regulators, and auditors 
(Abernathy et al. 2017). Investors prefer a shorter period because it helps them to adjust 
their investment decisions in a timely manner (Habib and Bhuiyan 2011). 
Whittered and Zimmer (1984) also noted that the increasing delay in issuing the financial 
reporting is concurrent with the issuance of a qualified audit report or the existence of 
financial problems in the firms. Under the resource-based theory, the higher ability 
managers are more likely to provide financial statements in a timely manner, as they are 
more knowledgeable of their business, which drives them to do better judgments and 
estimates (Demerjian et al. 2013). In addition, they are more likely to apply and understand 
complex standards, which in turn, increases their confidence in the internal control system 
(Plumlee and Yohn 2010). Abernathy et al. (2018) investigate a sample of U S firms from 
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2003 to 2014, the results confirm a negative relationship between managerial ability and 
financial reporting lag. Accordingly, our hypothesis will be as follows:    
H1: There is a positive effect of managerial ability on financial reporting timeliness 
in Egypt.  
3-Research Design:   
3.1 Sample and Data collection: 
We examine Egyptian firms listed on EGX100 from 2014 to 2018, we collect data manually 
from the annual report, financial services firms are excluded due to the uniqueness of 
earnings-generating processes and their asset structure, utility firms also excluded because 
of the regulation for its output price. Data envelop analysis (DEA) requires a sufficient 
number of observations to provide a valuable estimation, we require large observations in 
each industry to estimate DEA, industries with observations less than 25 observations are 
excluded. Consequently, the final sample was 310 observations for 62 firms. Table no. (1) 
Shows the sample distributed by industries. 
Table (1): Sample distributed according industry 
 Industry Firms Observations % 
1 Food, Beverages and Tobacco  11 55 17.74% 
2 Construction & materials 9 45 14.52% 
3 Industrial Goods, Services and Automobiles  7 35 11.29% 
4 Travels and leisure  5 25 8.06% 
5 Real Estate 11 55 17.74% 
6 Personal & household 6 30 9.68% 
7 Basic Resources  6 30 9.68% 
8 Chemicals 7 35 11.29% 
            Total  310 100% 
3.2 Measuring variables: 
3.2.1 Managerial Ability:  
We depend on the data envelope analysis (DEA) to measure managerial ability, it is a 
non-parametric method presented by Demerjian et al. (2012) to measure the relative 
efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs). DEA is a technique relies on linear programming 
to create efficiency boundary for specific DMUs to maximize the ratio of outputs to inputs, 
this technique assigns one to the most efficient DMUs, which are on the boundary, and 
assigns less than one values to an inefficient DMUs, assigning efficiency scores for an 
inefficient unit depends on the distance of DMUs from the boundary. We follow Demerjian 
et al. (2012), applying two-step methods, the first step solve the optimization problem by 
applying DEA technique that maximizes an output variable based on seven input variables 
as follow:   
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𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃 = 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
× [𝑣1𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑆 +  𝑣2𝑆𝐺& 𝐴 + 𝑣3𝑃𝑃𝐸 +  𝑣4 𝑂𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝑣5𝑅& 𝐷 + 𝑣6𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙
+  𝑣7𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛]
−1𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (1) 
According to model (1), sales revenue is our sole outputs, however, we depend on seven 
inputs as follow; COGS is the cost of goods sold, SG&A is selling, administrative and general 
expenses, PP&E is net property, plant, and equipment, OpsLease is capitalized operating 
leases, R&D is research and development expenses, Goodwill is purchased goodwill, 
OtherIntan is goodwill and other intangible assets purchased. Due to the 
Shortcoming of information in the financial statements about some of the previous items in 
the majority of observations in our sample, such as; OpsLease, R&D, Goodwill, and 
OtherIntan. So that, we depend on the most important inputs available in our sample, and 
therefore our final efficiency model will be  as follow : 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃 = 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 × [𝑣1𝐶𝑜𝐺𝑆 +  𝑣2𝑆𝐺& 𝐴 + 𝑣3𝑃𝑃𝐸 ]
−1𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (2) 
Model (2) contributes to measureing overall efficiency in firms, it captures the efficiency 
drivers of the firms and managers together, to reduce the overstating or understating in 
managerial efficiency, the overall efficiency of the firms will be analyzed into the efficiency 
related to the firms and those related to managerial efficiency. Accordingly, The following 
Tobit model was estimated for each industry to purge the characteristics of the firm 
(Demerjian et al. 2012; Baik et al. 2019):  
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝐵1𝐿𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐹𝐶𝐹 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵4𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵5𝐼𝑛𝑑. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝐵6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐵7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖    𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (3) 
Where Ln(Total Assets)it is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm (i) in the year (t). 
Market Shareit is the market share for the firm (i) in the year (t), measured by the ratio of 
firms' sales to total industry sales. FCFit is a dummy variable equal one if the firm (i) in the 
year (t) has positive free cash flows, zero otherwise. Ln(Age)it is the natural logarithm of firm 
age for the firm (i) in the year (t). Ind.concentrationit is industry concentration, calculated as 
the ratio of total firm sales to sum of industry’s sales squares. Foreign Currencyit is a dummy 
variable equal one if the firm (i) in the year (t) has reported positive value for foreign 
currency adjustment, zero otherwise. Residualsit is residual from the equation which reflects 
managerial ability score. 
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3.2.2 Financial reporting timeliness: 
We follow Afify (2009) and Abernathy et al. (2018), to measure financial reporting 
timeliness depending on financial reporting lag (FRLag1), which calculated as the number of 
days elapsed between the end of the year and signing the audit report, we also depend on 
industry-adjusted financial reporting lag (FRLag2) which measured by the financial 
reporting lag less the industry mean values of financial reporting lag.  
3.2.3 Control variables: 
We incorporate some control variables in our model, the control variables relate to firm size, 
firm's profitability, leverage, firm's growth, audit firm size (Afify 2009; Habib and Bhuiyan 
2011; Abernathy et al. 2018). Earnings management is incorporated as control variables 
measured by the cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) model presented by Becker et 
al. (1998). In addition, we control for auditor opinion and foreign currency income, 
industries type, and years.  
3.3 Empirical Design: 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model:   
𝐹𝑅𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐵1(𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝐵2(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝐵3(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡) + 𝐵4(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡) + 𝐵5(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐵6(𝐴𝑢𝑑_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝐵7(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐_𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝐵8(𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡)+ 𝐵9(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝐵10(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝐵11(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 (4) 
Where FRLagit is financial reporting lag, we depend on two methods to measure financial 
reporting lag, the first one is FRLag1it calculated as the number of days elapsed between the 
end of the year and signing the audit report, the second one is FRLag2it is industry-adjusted 
financial reporting lag which measured by the financial reporting lag less the 
industry mean value of financial reporting lag. The MAit is managerial ability measured as 
shown in section (3.2). ROEit is the return on equity for the firm (i) in the year (t). Firm Sizeit 
is a the natural logarithm for total assets for the firm (i) in the year (t). Levit is the firm's 
leverage for the firm (i) in the year (t), measured as total liabilities divided by lag total assets. 
Growthit is a percentage change of sales for the firm (i) in the year (t). Aud_Sizeit is a dummy 
variable equal one if the firm (i) in the year (t) audited by big4 auditor, zero otherwise. 
Disc_Accit is the absolute value of discretionary accruals for if the firm (i) in the year (t), we 
follow Becker et al. (1998) who calculate discretionary accruals depending on a cross-
sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Opinionit is a dummy variable equal (1) if the firm 
(i) in the year (t) has a qualified opinion, zero otherwise. Foreignit is a dummy variable equal 
(1) if the firm (i) in the year (t), reports a positive value for foreign currency adjustment, 
zero otherwise.  




4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations: 
Table (2) provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression tests based 
on the full sample. The mean (median) of MAit is 0.675 (0.892), this indicates increase 
managerial ability in our sample. The mean (median) of FRLag1it , and FRLag2it is  76.351, 
2.065 (72, -2.213) respectively, this indicates that firms in the sample are experienced an 
increase in financial reporting lag. The mean (median) of FirmSizeit is 20.949 (20.745), the 
mean (median) of ROEit is 0.145 (0.0811). The mean (median) of Levit is 0.414 (0.393) this 
indicates an increase in the debt to total assets ratio in our sample. The mean (median) of 
Growthit is 0.103 (0.076). The mean (median) of discretionary accruals (Disc_Accit) is 0.071 
(0.047).  
Table (2): Descriptive statistics for the full sample    
 Mean S.E Mean  Median STD Minimum Maximum 
FRLag1it 76.351 1.317 72.000 23.196 18.000 132.000 
FRLag2it 2.065 1.344 -2.213 23.669 -54.930 62.110 
MAit 0.675 0.025 0.892 0.446 -0.370 1.490 
FirmSizeit 20.949 0.102 20.745 1.803 17.040 25.160 
ROEit 0.145 0.012 0.0811 0.215 -0.380 0.640 
Levit 0.414 0.014 0.393 0.259 0.000 1.000 
Growthit 0.103 0.026 0.076 0.460 -0.850 1.020 
Disc_Accit 0.071 0.003 0.047 0.063 0.000 0.220 
Frequencies  
Aud_Sizeit Opinionit Foreignit 
Big 4  Non Big 4  qualified   unqualified  Non-zero  Zero value  
118 192 117 193 234 76 
38.1% 61.9% 37.7% 62.3% 75.5% 24.5% 
 
Table (3) provides a Pearson correlation matrix between variables. The results show that 
managerial ability (MAit) does not relate to the first proxy for financial reporting lag 
(FRLag1it). However, there is a negative relation between managerial ability (MAit) and 
adjusted lag (FRLag2it) this relation is significant at 5% level. There is a negative relation 
between managerial ability (MAit) and opinionit at 1% level, which indicates that as the 
managerial ability increases the probability of a qualified audit report being issued will be 
decreased. There is a negative relation between managerial ability (MAit) and Dis_Accit at 1% 
level, which indicates that as managerial ability increase the discretionary accruals 
decreased (earnings quality increased). 




Table (3): Pearson correlation matrix between variables 
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
          1 1- FRLag1it 
         1 0.918*** 2- FRLag2it 
        1 -0.131** -0.022 3- MAit 
       1 0.138** 0.144** 0.118** 4- FirmSizeit 
      1 0.080 0.069 -0.108* -0.075 5- ROEit 
     1 0.358*** -0.017 -0.109* 0.013 0.119** 6-Levit 
    1 0.104* 0.156*** 0.079 0.000 -0.017 -0.027 7-Growthit 
   1 0.060 -0.021 -0.101* 0.239*** 0.211*** -0.111* -0.053 8- Aud_Sizeit 
  1 -0.122** 0.001 -0.022 0.118** -0.037 -0.226*** -0.089 -0.127** 9- Disc_Accit 
 1 0.165*** -0.460*** -0.008 0.145** 0.183*** -0.017 -0.147*** 0.279*** 0.249*** 10- Opinionit 
1 0.150*** 0.252*** -0.017 -0.022 0.009 0.080 0.024 -0.075 0.052 0.094* 11- Foreignit 
***, **,*  Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10  levels, respectively. 
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4.2 Regression Results for the effect of managerial ability on financial reporting 
timeliness:  
Table 4, shows the (OLS) results about the effect of managerial ability on financial 
reporting timeliness. It is clear from the table; Fisher’s F values are significant in the 
models, adjusted R2 varies between 0.259 for (FRLag1it) and 0.171 for (FRLag2it). This 
confirms that our regression models seem to be satisfactory.  
The results provide evidence that managerial ability (MAit) has a significantly negative 
effect on financial reporting lag (FRLag1it and FRLag2it) at 1% and 5% level, 
respectively. This provides support to H1. Regarding control variables, that firm size 
(firmsizeit) and auditor opinion (opinionit) have a significantly positive effect on 
financial reporting lag (FRLag1it and FRLag2it) at 1% level. Return on equity (ROEit) has 
a significantly negative effect on financial reporting lag (FRLag1it and FRLag2it) at 10% 
and 1% level, respectively. Discretionary accruals (Disc_Accit) have a significantly 
negative effect on financial reporting timeliness (timeliness2) at 1% level. Leverage 
(Levit), Foreign income (Foreignit), firm growth (Growthit) and auditor size (Aud_Sizeit) 
have an insignificant effect on financial reporting lag (FRLag1it and FRLag2it).     
 




Coefficient t-value Sig. VIF Coefficient t-value Sig. VIF 
Constant 30.881 2.010 0.045  -45.134 -2.972 0.003  
MAit -15.452 -3.281 0.001 3.428 -6.855 -2.328 0.021 1.152 
FirmSizeit 1.983 2.823 0.005 1.244 2.381 3.338 0.001 1.102 
ROEit -11.758 -1.927 0.055 1.344 -16.895 -2.641 0.009 1.267 
Levit 0.872 0.160 0.873 1.544 2.095 0.403 0.687 1.212 
Growthit -2.533 -0.997 0.319 1.059 -0.872 -0.320 0.749 1.047 
Aud_Sizeit -2.212 -0.752 0.453 1.586 -1.222 -0.407 0.684 1.418 
Disc_Accit -43.472 -1.428 0.154 2.876 -59.291 -2.842 0.005 1.160 
Opinionit 13.850 4.797 0.000 1.523 14.319 4.819 0.000 1.385 
Foreignit 3.434 1.050 0.294 1.537 2.523 0.849 0.397 1.092 
observations 310 310 
Industry Dummies yes No 
Year Dummies yes yes 
 F. Test 6.399*** 5.917*** 
R2 0.307 0.206 
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.171 
***, **,*  Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10  levels, respectively. 
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4.3 Additional analysis:  
We extended our model (4) to incorporate corporate governance as a control variable, 
Afify (2009) shows that board independence has a significant effect on financial 
reporting timeliness in Egypt. Table 5, shows the results of testing our hypothesis (H1) 
after controlling the board independence, measured by the ratio of the number of 
outside directors to the total number of directors, and board duality. The results 
confirm that managerial ability (MAit) has a significantly negative effect on financial 
reporting lag (FRLag1it and FRLag2it) at 1% and 5% level, respectively. These results 
are consistent with the previous results in our main analysis (section 4.2), which 
support our  hypothesis (H1). The results also show that board independence 
variables (%Outside Directors and duality) have an insignificant effect on financial 
reporting lag (FRLag1it and FRLag2it).    
  
Table (5): OLS regression to measure the effect of managerial ability on financial reporting 
timeliness after controlling the board independence  
 
FRLag1it dependent variable   FRLag2it dependent variable 
Coefficient  t-value Sig. VIF Coefficient t-value Sig. VIF 
Constant 34.589 1.989 0.048  -40.689 -2.396 0.017  
MAit -15.057 -3.160 0.002 3.494 -6.671 -2.224 0.027 1.192 
FirmSizeit 1.967 2.784 0.006 1.253 2.392 3.341 0.001 1.108 
ROEit -11.129 -1.806 0.072 1.364 -16.115 -2.502 0.013 1.281 
Levit -0.330 -0.059 0.953 1.636 0.618 0.115 0.909 1.298 
Growthit -2.365 -0.927 0.355 1.065 -0.709 -0.260 0.795 1.050 
Aud_Sizeit -2.477 -0.832 0.406 1.617 -1.828 -0.598 0.550 1.469 
Disc_Accit -46.476 -1.514 0.131 2.912 -58.026 -2.769 0.006 1.168 
Opinionit 14.051 4.756 0.000 1.588 14.726 4.829 0.000 1.456 
Foreignit 2.821 0.823 0.411 1.681 2.040 0.666 0.506 1.156 
%Outside Directors -0.382 -0.052 0.958 1.342 0.108 0.014 0.989 1.251 
Duality -2.588 -0.887 0.376 1.455 -3.246 -1.124 0.262 1.227 
observations 310 310 
Industry Dummies yes No 
Year Dummies yes yes 
 F. Test 5.830*** 5.205*** 
R2 0.309 0.210 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.170 
***, **,*  Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10  levels, respectively. 
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4.4 Robustness Check:   
To check the validity of our results, we depend on industry-adjusted (MAit), managerial 
ability is measured as a dummy variable equal one if (MAit) is bigger than the industry 
mean. Table 6, shows the (OLS) regression to test the effect of managerial ability on 
financial reporting timeliness depending on (MAit) as a dummy variable. Adjusted R2 
is 0.244 (was 0.259 in the first analysis) for FRLag1it, and 0.172 for FRLag2it (was 0.259 
in the first analysis). Fisher’s F values still significant in the models. The results confirm 
that managerial ability (MAit) has a significantly negative effect on financial reporting 
lag (FRLag1it and FRLag2it) at 5% in both cases. 
 
Table (6): Managerial ability and financial reporting timeliness, robustness check 
 
FRLag1it dependent variable   FRLag2t dependent variable 
Coefficient  t-value Sig. VIF Coefficient t-value Sig. VIF 
Constant 35.296 2.135 0.034  -43.920 -2.617 0.009  
MA_Dummyit -5.812 -2.343 0.020 1.171 -6.135 -2.397 0.017 1.092 
FirmSizeit 1.909 2.674 0.008 1.261 2.538 3.520 0.001 1.126 
ROEit -11.824 -1.906 0.058 1.360 -18.105 -2.851 0.005 1.249 
Levit 2.534 0.456 0.649 1.581 2.498 0.470 0.639 1.266 
Growthit -1.503 -0.585 0.559 1.063 -0.226 -0.083 0.934 1.051 
Aud_Sizeit -3.060 -1.011 0.313 1.647 -3.884 -1.279 0.202 1.453 
Disc_Accit -47.159 -1.524 0.128 2.912 -50.066 -2.441 0.015 1.122 
Opinionit 13.325 4.426 0.000 1.624 14.088 4.583 0.000 1.483 
Foreignit 2.431 0.705 0.481 1.676 3.171 1.023 0.307 1.188 
%Outside Directors -0.371 -0.050 0.960 1.352 0.145 0.019 0.985 1.245 
Duality -3.309 -1.128 0.260 1.448 -3.535 -1.225 0.222 1.228 
observations 310 310 
Industry Dummies yes No 
Year Dummies yes yes 
 F. Test 5.544*** 5.271*** 
R2 0.298 0.212 
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.172 
***, **,*  Indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10  levels, respectively. 
5-Discussion, Conclusion, and Future Research:  
Managerial ability is a research topic that has attracted attention in recent research as 
one of the important resources that add real value to firms' performance and support 
firms' competitive advantages. Theoretical evidence confirms the importance of 
managerial ability for firms, however, this has not been fully confirmed at the 
empirical level. Some research results confirm a positive effect of managerial ability 
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on earnings quality (Demerjian et al. 2013; Huang and Sun 2017; Sales et al. 2015; 
Wang et al. 2017; García-Meca and García-Sánchez 2018; Petkevich and Prevost 2018). 
However, other research confirms the opportunism hypothesis for higher ability 
managers, this research confirms a negative relation between managerial ability and 
earnings quality (Baik et al. 2012; Hassanzadeh et al. 2013) . 
We extended the research that examines the effect of managerial ability on financial 
reporting quality, by examining the effect of managerial ability on financial reporting 
timeliness. Under the resource-based theory, we expect that higher ability managers 
will provide financial reporting in a timeliness manner, so that we expect a negative 
relationship between managerial ability and financial reporting lag in Egypt (H1). We 
run (OLS) regression for model (4) to test our hypothesis.    
The results are consistent with our hypothesis; we find a negative effect of managerial 
ability on financial reporting timeliness across all analyses. This is consistent with the 
results provided by Abernathy et al. (2018) who test the relationship in the United 
States. Despite the low investor protection in Egypt as one of the emerging economies, 
our results are consistent with the efficiency hypothesis for managerial ability, this 
results confirm that managerial ability is one of the important resources which add 
value in emerging economies. Consequently, we recommend future research to 
confirm the implications of managerial ability in emerging economies such as; the 
effect of managerial ability on tax avoidance, future performance, firm value, corporate 
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